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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VERA L. JOHNSON,

/

Plaintiff/Appellant, /
vs.

/

HAROLD L. JOHNSON,

/

Case No. 860U37

Defendant/Respondent. /
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I

Is the plaintiff entitled to a portion of the defendant's
military retirement benefits pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §1408?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff has sought post-divorce relief for arrearages in
alimony payments and for a portion of the defendant's military
retirement benefits after previously appearing before the trial
court after the decree had been entered for arrearages in child
support.

The lower court denied the plaintifffs request for a

portion of the defendant's military retirement benefits on the
grounds that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting the claim

due to the fact that she had previously appeared before the court
approximately one (1) year before raising post-divorce issues.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce
that was signed and entered on February 3, 1982 by the Honorable
J. Duffy Palmer, District Court Judge. (R 27-29)
been

married

March

17,

encompassed

eighteen

thirty-one

(31) total

service.

The

Decree

1963

(18)

and

years

years

the

and

term

ten

of

the

(10) months

that defendant

of Divorce

The parties had

spent

incorporated

the

marriage
of

the

in military
terms

of a

Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement (R 21-22) that the
parties entered into on December 28, 1981.

The decree provided

in relevant part as follows:

That the defendant be and hereby is ordered to pay
the plaintiff the sum of $400.00 per month as and for
alimony, same to commence January 1, 198 2, with said
sum to increase to $450.00 per month commencing October
1, 1982, and on April 1, 1983, said sum shall increase
to $500.00 per month.
3.
That the plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded
all household furniture and furnishings she has in her
possession; the 1978 Lincoln Continental Mark V and her
personal belongings and effects.
4.
That the defendant be and hereby is awarded the
Pontiac automobile; the furniture and furnishings in
his possession, and his personal belongings and
effects.
5.
That the defendant be and hereby is ordered to
assume and discharge all marital debts and obligations
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in the approximate amount of $12,000.00 and each party
is ordered to assume and discharge any debts he may
have incurred separately since August 13, 1981, the
date of separation. (R 27-29)
Neither

the divorce

decree nor the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law (R 24-26) made mention of the military retirement that the defendant would obtain upon the termination of his
military career; however, the Findings of Fact at paragraph 6 (R
25) noted, "that the plaintiff is a well and able bodied person;
that the defendant is also a well and able bodied person."

In

paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact it noted "that during said
marriage, the parties herein have accumulated various items of
personal property."
Subsequent to the divorce, the plaintiff filed a "Verified
Affidavit

in

Support

of

Order

to

Show

Cause"

(R 30- 32) and

obtained an Order to Show Cause in re Contempt (R 33) requiring
the defendant to appear and show cause why he should not be found
in contempt for failure to make certain alimony payments.

The

Order to Show Cause was originally heard before the Honorable
Rodney

S. Page, District

District, on June 21, 1984.

Court

Judge

of

the

Second

Judicial

The plaintiff was granted a judgment

against the defendant, which was later reduced to an Order and
Judgment

(R 38-39)

in the sum of $3,400.00

and defendant was

further required to pay $200.00 in attorney's fees and costs of
$19.00 and ordered to continue to pay alimony at the rate of
$500.00.

-3-

The Congress of the United States enacted the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses Protection Act with an effective date of
February 1, 1983.

The Act was undertaken in response to McCarty

v. McCarty, 453 US 210 (1981) , which was decided prior to the
instant parties1 original divorce.

The plaintiff here made no

claim for relief with regards to the defendant's military retirement benefits in the 1984 Order to Show Cause hearing, despite
the fact that the effective date of the legislation was after the
entry of the decree of divorce.
In September

of

1985 the plaintiff

once again

tiled a

Verified Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause (R 40-41)
and obtained

an Order to Show Cause in re Contempt

(R 42)

requiring the defendant to appear and answer why he should not be
found in contempt for failure to make certain alimony payments.
The affidavit contained no allegations of claim or grievance with
regard to the military retirement benefits; however, the matter
was heard by stipulation at the time of hearing on November 14,
1985

(See

transcript

page

3

through

4)

and

was

met

with

defendant's counter-evidence to the fact that he had suffered a
change of circumstances mandating a reduction in the alimony
award.
The Court found that the defendant was in arrears in alimony
in the sum of $1,119.00 and that plaintiff was entitled to a
total delinquency

judgment

in the

sum of $4,500.00

(R 46);

further the Court found that the defendant's income had decreased

-4-

since his

retirement

from

the military

in June of

$2,300.00 per month to $1,700.00 per month

(R 47).

1985

from

The Court

concluded that the reduction in pay of 21 percent entitled the
defendant
$500.00

to

to

determined
alimony,

an

equal

$391.00
that

per

the

despite

reduction
month.

in
(R

plaintiff

was

defendant's

the

alimony

46-48)

The

entitled

allegations

Court

to
of

payment

a

further

continuing

cohabitation.

Finally, the Court ruled that the plaintiff was estopped
bringing

a claim

against

the defendant

from

for a portion

from

of his

military retirement benefits which had been accumulated during
his 31 years of military service.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The

plaintiff

assumes

the

position

that

the

Uniformed

Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §1408, automatically requires the court to allow a former spouse a proportionate

interest

in

retirement

benefits.

The

Act

does

not

specifically mandate that a former spouse be awarded a portion of
the military retirement benefits.
legislation

indicates

Legislative history behind the

that the retroactive

application

of the

same was designed to assist "aggrieved parties" who were divorced
after McCarty v. McCarty, 452 US 210 (1981).
not a

"wronged" party. She received

the

Plaintiff herein is
lion's

share

of

the

assets and was debt free pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation
and Property Settlement Agreement as incorporated into the Decree
of Divorce.

The trial court in the November 1985 hearing noted,
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in

the

reporters

consideration
retirement

transcript

was

taken

benefits

(T

as

during

to
the

Property Settlement Agreement.

34) , that

it

the

of

time

asset
of

the

appeared
the

that

military

Stipulation

and

That being the case, the division

of the assets conformed with Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431
(Utah,

1982)

division

in

that

the

of property

parties.

asset was

rights

and

debt

considered

in

the

responsibilities

total
of

the

Thus, there was no harm inflicted upon the plaintiff

that required implication of the congressional act to "undo" the
divorce decree.
Two years after the entry of the original Decree of Divorce,
the plaintiff appeared before the court on a show cause hearing
concerning the defendant's arrears in alimony payments.
cause hearing was heard

in May of

The show

1984, two years after

effective date of the involved legislation.

the

At that time, the

plaintiff sought no relief to modify the Decree of Divorce in
requesting

a

portion

of

the

defendant's

military

retirement

benefits, despite the fact that she was aided by counsel.

The

plaintiff's failure to bring any potential claim at that time
estopped her from asserting it in 1985 at her second post-divorce
proceeding

regarding

arrearages

in alimony.

The plaintiff

is

estopped not simply by the lapse of time, but by the implication
of

the

further,

principles
the

of

equitable

Stipulation

and

estoppel, waiver
Property

and

Settlement

laches;

Agreement

entered into between that parties included a recitation that "the
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parties

hereto

agree

that

settlement of the property

the

foregoing

is

an

equitable

rights, alimony, and other demands

that each of said parties have or has had, one against the other,
and in the event the defendant is awarded a decree of divorce,
each consents to the stipulation, in substance

and effect be

incorporated and become a part of said decree." (R 22)
In the show cause hearing of November 1985, plaintiff failed
to present to the court a material change in circumstances of a
compelling nature that required a modification of the original
Decree

of

Divorce.

In

fact, the

only

substantial

change

in

circumstances presented at the November 1985 show cause hearing
was

with

regards

to

twenty-one percent

the

(21%).

reduction

in

defendant's

income

of

The resultant reduction in income of

defendant caused the court to reduce his alimony obligation to
plaintiff by twenty-one percent

(21%) .

Without the presence of

compelling facts indicating a change in the circumstances, the
trial court found no basis for modifying the Decree of Divorce
concerning the issue military retirement.
The decision of the trial court was based upon facts and
evidence

presented

therein

and

referenced

to

the

earlier

proceedings before that court; specifically, the 1984 show cause
hearing
Decree

concerning
of

Divorce,

the

arrearage

which

was

of

based

support
upon

Property Settlement Agreement of the parties.
lower

court's

determination

denying
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and
a

the

original

Stipulation

and

Consequently, the

plaintiff

a

portion

of

defendant's military retirement benefits was proper and should be
upheld.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS NOT AN "AGRIEVED" PARTY AND NECESSARILY
ENTITLED TO ANY PORTION OF DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT PURSUANT
TO THE UNIFORM SERVICES FORMER SPOUSE PROTECTION ACT, 10
U.S.C. §1408
In response to McCarty v. McCarty 453 US 210

(1981), the

Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection
Law, Public Law 97-252.

The essence of the Act is to give the

state courts the ability to include in a property distribution of
divorce

proceedings

military

retirement

benefits.

The

Act

specifically provides in Sec. (c)(1):
"...a Court may treat disposable retired or retainer
pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after
June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member
or as property of the member and his spouse in
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such
court,"
It should be noted at the outset that the language of the
statute is not compulsive and states "may" be free to choose the
particular application of the benefits as marital property
nonmarital property.

or

In Smith v. Smith, 458 A.2d 711 (Del. Fam.

Ct. , 1983), the court was confronted with a similar situation to
the one at hand and the committee report which accompanied the
bill, page one, as follows:
The primary purpose of the bill is to remove the effect
of the United States Supreme Court decision in McCarty
v. McCarty, 458 (453) US 210 101 S. CT. 2728 69 L.Ed.

-8-

2d 589 (1981). The bill would accomplish their objective by permitting federal, state and certain other
courts, consistent with the appropriate laws, to once
again consider military retire pay when fixing the
property rights between the parties to a divorce,
dissolution, annulment or legal separation.
Further, the report provided that, Page 5:
Former spouses divorced in the interim period between
the McCarty decision and the effective date of this law
will have the opportunity to return to court to have
their decrees modified in light of this legislation.
The
"Congress

Smith

court

clearly

felt

noted,
that

with

regards

spouses

to

agrieved

this
as

language,

a result of

McCarty should have a chance to rectity this situation" through
the retroactive application of the law.
is that of "spouses agrieved".

The key element therein

The Smith court permitted the

spouse to modify the decree of divorce and obtain a portion of
the military retirement benefits.
plaintiff who

is not

The situation at bar finds a

"agrieved"; rather, the decision of the

district court in adopting the Stipulation and Property Settlement of the parties at the time of the decree should conport with
with then operative law with regards thereto.

See Englert v.

Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah, 1978) and Bennett v. Bennett, 607
P.2d

839

(Utah,

1980).

The

Bennett

pronouncement

of

not

considering nonvested pension rights was overturned by Woodward
v. Woodward, op. cit.
the

property

Even in light of the Woodward decision,

distribution

of

the

parties

herein

appeared

to

contemplate the defendant's military retirement, as noted by the
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District Court Judge at page

34 of the reporter's

transcript

wherein he indicated as follows:
As to the question of retirement, the Court finds that
the parties were divorced in 1983; that they entered
into a stipulation for the divorce at that time and the
Court assumes that they considered all the parties'
property in their 18 years of marriage together, I
think that is reflective of the fact that there was an
alimony awarded of a substantial amount which was of an
unlimited duration.
Accompanying the significant alimony award is the fact that the
defendant undertook all of the marital debts, which were of a sum
of approximately $12,000.00.
In Wallace v. Wallace, 671 P.2d

711

(Or. App. 1983) the

Oregon court was confronted with an appeal by the spouse of a
retired Navy officer.

The property settlement denied the spouse

a forty-five percent (45%) interest in the husband's retirement
pension.

The court indicated at page 714 that:
After McCarty, but before the Act became effective,
this court stated that a spouse's military retirement
pension, while not divisible, can be considered in
awarding support or making property divisions...The act
permits, but does not require, state courts to consider
military retirement payments as marital property.

The

court

concluded

that

evidence

of

the

husband's

military

retirement pension was considered in establishing the amount of
alimony payable to the wife and thus an allocation of a portion
of the benefits was not required.

The circumstances at hand are

identical to that of the Wallace matter and mandate support of
the district court ruling.

-10-

Plaintiff, in her brief, cites cases wherein the parties
were permitted to modify the decree of divorce and receive a
portion of the spouse's military retirement benefits.

It appears

that the large body of those cases involved community property
states wherein it is well established that property which is not
mentioned in the decree of divorce results in a tenancy in common
between the parties in that asset.

Henn v. Henn, 605 P. 2d 10

(Cal., 1980), Walentowski v. Walentowski, 672 P.2d 657 (N.M.,
1983), Gordon v. Gordon, 659 S.W.2d 475

(Tex. App. 13# Dist. ,

1983), de Carteret v. de Carteret, 615 P.2d 513
1980) .

(Wash. App.,

The courts in each of those circumstances dealt with an

asset that required
divorce.

specific resolution after the decree of

Further, in each of the above cases, as cited by

plaintiff, there was no indication that the court had considered
the military retirement in awarding alimony or other division of
properties, as was specifically noted in the Wallace, op. cit.
As previously indicated in the instant case, it appears from the
stipulation, pleadings, orders and comments of the court (see
reporter's

transcript

page

34) that the military

retirement

benefits were considered by the parties and the court at the
original Decree of Divorce.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM
MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS

-11-

RAISING

THE

ISSUE

OF

The

court

found

that

the

plaintiff

was

estopped

asserting a claim for the military retirement benefits.
Estoppel

can

equitable

undertake

principle

several

that

is

forms;

called

it

into

is

from
(R 47)

basically

effect

in

an

several

different respects in this particular matter.
A.

RES JUDICATA
The plaintiff was before the court on two separate occasions

before

making

a

request

retirement benefits.

for

an

allocations

of

the

military

The original divorce proceeding permitted

the plaintiff an opportunity to have the matter heard; further,
the plaintiff appeared before the court in May of 1984 with the
opportunity to litigate the question of modification with regards
to military
after

retirement benefits.

the effective

brought

with

the

The May

date of the involved

assistance

of

counsel.

1984 appearance was
legislation
In

neither

and was
of

the

above-mentioned occasions did the plaintiff assert a claim for a
portion

of

the

defendant's

military

retirement

benefits.

In

Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303 (Utah, 1985), the Utah Supreme
Court determined that an action by a former husband against a
former spouse to reconvey a partial interest in real property was
prohibited by res judicata.
after

Mr.

Jacobson

had

The parties were divorced in 1977,

conveyed

an

interest

in

property

to

Mrs. Jacobson and alleged that she had promised to reconvey half
of

the

interest

of

that property

back

to Mr. Jacobson

after

conclusion of litigation between Mr. Jacobson and his first wife.

-12-

The parties had been named as defendants in an action over the
title

of

the

property

several

years

prior

to

the

divorce

proceeding and Mr. Jacobson was dismissed from that case upon his
representation

that

he

had

no

interest

Jacobson was

subsequently

property two

(2) years prior to the divorce.

resolved upon
entire

awarded

in

the entire

the

interest

in the

land.

Mr. Jacobson

Mrs.
in the

The divorce was

stipulation, wherein Mrs. Jacobson

interest

land.

received

subsequently

the
com-

plained that he had been induced to sign the property settlement
agreement upon the condition that the former spouse would promise
to

reconvey

the

interest

in

the

property.

The

trial

determined that his action was barred by res judicata.

court

The court

repeated the language of Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P. 2d 1287,
1289, wherein it said:
Where there has been an adjudication, it becomes res
judicata as to those issues which were either tried and
determined, or upon all issues which the party had a
fair opportunity to present and had determined in the
other proceeding. 703 P.2d at 305.
The court further noted that the principle had application in
and stated:
This court is clearly committed to the proposition that
in order to modify a prior decree, the moving party
must show a substantial change in circumstances. In
the absence of such a showing, the decree shall not be
modified in a matter previously litigated and incorporated therein cannot be collaterally attacked in the
face of the doctrine of res judicata. 703 P.2d at 305
from Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091
(Utah, 1978) .

-13-

In the instant case, the Decree of Divorce should not be
modified because the plaintiff had a "fair opportunity to present
and have determined"

the issue of any claims

in the military

retirement of defendant,
B.

WAIVER
The

doctrine

of waiver

principle of estoppel.

is

a

further

application

of

the

In American Savings and Loan Association

v, Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Utah, 1968), the Utah Supreme Court was
confronted with a mortgage foreclosure action and was required to
determine whether the plaintiffs had waived the contents of a
default notice through a subsequent letter.

In determining that

there had been no waiver in that circumstance, the court defined
waiver at page 3 as follows:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right.
To constitute a waiver, there must be an
existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of
its existence and an intention to relinquish it. It
must be distinctly made although it may be express or
implied.
In the instant case, the case of the plaintiff and failing to
proceed on a claim for military retirement benefits amounted to
implied waiver.

The plaintiff was possessed

of the knowledge

that the defendant would receive retirement pay after his completion of his military
service

was

not

service.

completed

until

The

fact that the military

June

of

1985

was

of

no

significance and the plaintiff not was required to wait until the
expiration of the military service.

-14-

In the Court of Appeals of Washington, Myser v. Myser, 589
P.2d 277 (Wash, App. , 1979), an ex-wife of a retired Air Force
officer

sought to be declared

a co-tenant of the husband's

military pension payments which he had been receiving since the
time of the divorce.

The parties had been divorce pursuant to a

property settlement agreement which provided for child support
and

support

for

Mrs. Myser.

The

stipulation

and

property

settlement agreement provided that there was a "full and complete
settlement of all their property rights..."

The trial court

dismissed Mrs. Myserfs second action on the following grounds:
1.

The court lacked jurisdiction to declare the parties
tenants

in

common

with

respect

to

the

retirement

pension fund?
2.

Mrs. Myser waived any claim in regard to that fund by
virtue of the property settlement agreement;

3.

Mrs. Myser was estopped to assert any claim against the
pension

payment because

of the property

settlement

The terms of the agreement made pension

funds the

agreement; and
4.

separate property of Mr. Myser.

589 P.2d at 2 78.

The Washington Court went on to discuss the applicability of
military retirement benefits which at that time was basically in
line with the Utah Supreme Court holding in Bennett v. Bennett,
op. cit.

Further, in the Myser case, in tracing the history of

Washington decisions, the court noted that in In Re Marriage of
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Hagy, 581 P.2d b98

(Wash. App. , 1978) the court had found that

where it was the intention of the parties at the time of the
property settlement agreement in the divorce decree to provide a
full

and

complete

settlement

of

their

property

would be no reopening of the proceeding.

rights, there

In the case at hand,

the stipulation and property settlement agreement, paragraph 10
(R 22) provides as follows:
That the parties hereto agree that the foregoing is an
equitable settlement of the property rights, alimony,
and other demands that each of said parties may have or
have had, one against the other, and in the event the
defendant is awarded.a decree of divorce, each consents
that the stipulation, in substance and effect, may be
incorporated and made a part of said decree.
Thus,

the

plaintiff

effectively,

and

with

knowledge

of

the

existence of military retirement benefits, waived her rights to
any other property claims against the defendant.
C.

ESTOPPEL.
Justice

Maughn

in

Celebrity

Club,

Inc.

v.

Utah

Liquor

Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah, 1979) determined that the
Liquor Control Commissions denial of a license to a private club
where

it

had

previously

represented

that

the

club

was

in

compliance with statutes concerning location within 600 feet of
any public or private school specifically set forth the elements
of equitable estoppel as:
1.

An admission, statement or act inconsistent with the
claim afterwards asserted;
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2.

Action

by

the

other

party

on

the

faith

ot

such

admission, statement, or act; and
3.

Injury to such other party resulting from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such admission,
statement or act,

602 P.2d at 694

In this case, the defendant consented to a Stipulation and
Property Settlement Agreement wherein he and plaintiff mutually
agreed to release all claims; further, the plaintiff brought no
action against the defendant post-divorce to seek a portion of
military retirement benefits by bringing to the court's attention
an

arrearage

in

alimony.

Defendant

acted

on

the

acts

and

omissions of the plaintiff by agreeing to satisfy certain sums of
alimony, pay debts and ultimately terminate his military service.
The injuries received by defendant were through the assumption of
an increased portion of the debt and payment of a substantial sum
of alimony per month which may not otherwise have been assessed,
together with the latter reduction in available monthly income
from termination of service in the military.

The elements of

equitable estoppel as applied in the State of Utah are present to
prohibit

the plaintiff

from bringing

an

action

to

collect a

portion of the defendant's military retirement benefits.
D.

LACHES.
The

final

derivative

of

the

estoppel

concept

that

is

available to the defendant in this circumstance is the notion of
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laches.

The Utah Supreme Court in Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262

(Utah, 1980) set forth the two elements of laches to be:
1.

A lack of diligence of on the part of the plaintiff;
and

2.

An

injury

to

the

defendant

owing

to

such

lack

of

diligence.
In Leaver, the Court found that laches was not applicable to the
real estate claims regarding restrictive covenants, but noted at
page 1264 that:
The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by
his acts, representations or conduct or by his silence
when he ought to speak induces another to believe that
certain facts exist and such other relies thereon to
his detriment.
The analysis herein is similar and the acts and resultant
injury are identical to that indicated in the section above with
regards to equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SHOW A COMPELLING REASON THROUGH ANY
SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE
IN
CIRCUMSTANCES
TO
JUSTIFY
MODIFICATION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE
30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in part that:
The Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make
such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to
the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody
of the children and their support, maintenance, and
health and dental care, or the distribution of the
property as shall be reasonable and necessary.
With the ability to modify a decree of divorce, the trial
courts

in

any

given

circumstance
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must

determine

in

which

situations a decree may be modified.

In order to modify the

decree of divorce, the moving party must "show the trial court a
substantial
divorce."
the

change

in

the

circumstances

since

the

decree

Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah, 1985).

cases

involving

property,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

of
In
has

frequently been asked to determine if the same can be modified.
In Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah, 1980), the wife sought
modification

of

the

award

to

her

former

husband

percent (50%) lien interest in the marital home.
permitted

modification

due

to

certain

of

a

fifty

The trial court

financial

hardship

circumstances but was reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal.
The Court stated at page 414 that:
...where the property disposition is the product of an
agreement and stipulation between the parties, and
sanctioned by the trial court. Such a provision is the
product of an agreement bargained for by the parties.
As such, a trial court should subsequently modify such
a provision only with great reluctance, and based upon
compelling reasons.
The

Court

modification

failed

to

find

any

compelling

reason

for

the

in Foulger where the decree of divorce was based

upon a stipulation and property settlement agreement entered into
between the parties.
In Despain v, Despain, 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah, 1980), the Court
again

determined

that

there was

no

compelling

change

in the

circumstances such to modify a decree of divorce in regards to a
trust; more specifically where the moving party had entered into
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a release with regards to the property.

In so holding the Court

stated at pages 1305-1306:
This issue was most recently before the Court in Land
v. Land
(605 P.2d 1248, (Utah, 1986)) wherein we
observed that the outright abrogation of the provisions
of a property settlement agreement is to be resorted to
with great reluctance and only for compelling reasons.
In

this

case,

there

is

no

substantial

change

in

the

circumstances of a compellingly sufficient nature to modify the
decree as sought by the plaintiff.

The trial court determined

that the only compelling change in circumstances was the fact
that the defendant's income had decreased by 21 percent (R 4 7).
As

a

direct

result

of

the

defendant's

loss

of

income

from

$2,300.00 to $1,700.00 per month, his obligations for alimony was
reduced

by

an

month. (R 48-57)

equal

percentage,

from

$500.00

to

$391.00

per

There was no evidence brought to the court that

there had been any other change in circumstances of the parties
specifically sufficient enough to award the plaintiff an interest
in the defendant's military pay.

The fact that 10 U.S.C. 1408

(c) (1) provides that "a spouse may be entitled'1 to a portion of
the military

retirement benefits does not create the facts in

this particular circumstance

to justify a modification

of

the

original Decree of Divorce.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION AND SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED
'
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In order for the plaintiff to be successful on her appeal,
she must

"show the evidence clearly preponderates against the

findings or that the trial court has abused
Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d

360, 362

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 610 P.2d 1218

its discretion."

(Utah, 1985),

citing

(Utah, 1980) and Turner v.

Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah, 1982).
In Despain v. Despain, op. cit. the Court at page 1305-6, in
confirming

a

position

previously

stated

in

Jorgensen

v.

Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah, 1979), Kessimakis v. Kessimakis,
580 P.2d

1090, (Utah, 1978), Johnson v. Johnson, 560 P.2d 1132

(Utah, 1977) , that:
in the formulation of the original decree and any
modifications thereof; the trial court is vested broad
discretionary powers, which may be disturbed by an
appellant court only in the presence of clear abuse
thereof.
Herein the trial court noted

that prior

consideration

in the

original decree with regards to the substantial alimony award
payable on a continuing basis from the defendant to the plaintiff
(see reporter's transcript page 34) together with the contents of
the stipulation and finally the failure of the plaintiff to bring
her claim when she had previously been before the court on other
occasions estopped the plaintiff

from asserting a claim for a

portion of the defendant's military retirement benefits.
determination by the trial court was based
interpretation

of the evidence

as presented
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This

upon a reasonable
to the court and

supported by the contents of the record and therefore should not
be overturned.
CONCLUSION
It

is

undisputed

evident

from

facts which

plaintifffs

claim

retirement

benefits

for

the

were
a

were

foregoing

before

portion

the

of

properly

discussion
trial

the

court

defendant's

denied

and

that

and

the

that

the

military
the

lower

court's ruling should be atfirmed.
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